

# Decentralized Social Networking Protocol (DSNP)

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*Originally Released*

October 2020

*Revised Edition*

March 2024

## **Abstract**

The decentralized social networking protocol (DSNP) allows users to interact via a global, open, decentralized social graph, giving them control of their identities and personal data while avoiding the balkanization of the current social network platforms and creating an open ecosystem of network participants. We propose a protocol for writing and reading social network data on public consensus systems. This protocol defines how identity, social graph, and messaging elements are represented to create a decentralized social network. Applicable aspects of control, privacy, authenticity, portability, usability, and extensibility are addressed for each element. This paper is accompanied by a protocol specification document.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup><https://spec.dsn.org>

## Preface to the Revised Edition

In the several years since this white paper was first published, consensus systems—as represented by blockchains, distributed ledger systems, and other technologies—have continued to evolve rapidly, benefiting from both an increase in public interest and renewed enthusiasm from the worldwide academic and development communities. There has been a corresponding, and welcome, shift away from a seemingly single-minded focus on cryptocurrency and financialization toward a more nuanced idea of a world of decentralized identity and decentralized applications (dApps). While some discussion of economic incentives is unavoidable, and indeed important, for consensus systems to endure and thrive, this shift has helped to create a technological environment where the benefits of decentralization and consensus-based state management have been recognized as extending far beyond purely financial applications. This in turn has helped to usher in new language that allows us to speak about such systems in more inclusive terms: whereas the first edition of this paper referenced the well known blockchain smart contract paradigm specifically, we can, with the benefit of time and hindsight, address the protocol more generally in terms of consensus systems, shared state, and the invocation of operations and resulting state change records on these systems.

In preparing this revised edition, we have tried to avoid radical alterations to the original text; as such, this work can be viewed as both a historical document of the thought processes and design decisions that shaped the protocol initially, and as a statement of the objectives and design principles that should continue to be applied to the protocol’s future evolution. With that in mind, it is worth pointing out that some specific terminology or implementation strategies may now be different in the official DSNP specification (which did not exist when this white paper was first published). Where explanation is needed, we have provided footnotes to address the current state of protocol evolution and divergence from the initial proposal (such as the change from incremental Graph Change Events to bulk changes via a User Data management paradigm) but have kept the historical text as intact as possible, as in almost all cases the same concepts still apply, even if implementation strategies have changed. Finally, we have moved the section on Batch Announcements from the appendix to be its own core section. This reflects its importance for implementing DSNP systems that are economically viable and highly scalable.

# 1 Introduction

Most people have come to rely predominantly on private platforms serving as trusted third parties to manage and facilitate communication with their broadest network of relationships. This network is commonly known as a “social graph,” and presently most social graphs are privately owned and controlled by a small number of large technology companies. While the current ecosystem of social graphs has pioneered a new way for people to interact with their personal network and public figures on an unprecedented scale, it suffers from inherent weaknesses related to trust, incentive models, and equitable participation in the attention economy.

These large, corporate-owned social graphs have made it possible for people to expand their network of relationships to an extremely large scale. However, each social graph is isolated, locking in users as a result of the high cost of re-creating a social graph in another provider’s “walled garden.” This balkanized environment also prevents the broader developer community from helping to address challenging problems or contributing new innovations to improve this pervasive technology.

All major social networks employ personalization algorithms to determine what content is presented to users. These are centralized, usually closed algorithms that are opaque and proprietary, and they offer the user limited input or insight into how they operate. Through passive data collection, these algorithms often trigger users’ negative, fight-or-flight reactions to increase engagement.[1]

This approach, in turn, creates more advertising opportunities and drives more revenue to the large companies that control the largest social graphs. Malicious actors exploit these algorithms by deploying bots, artificial profiles, and divisive content to manipulate users at scale.

What is needed is a universally accessible, unified, and decentralized social graph that allows developers to build an ecosystem with a variety of applications. By decoupling applications and data, this ecosystem will allow for a wide range of personalization algorithms to be developed and employed by different applications, and even applied to specific communities and topics.

This new approach will enable users to move seamlessly between applications without rebuilding their network of friends and public figures at each destination. Further, users will be able to choose from a diverse set of recommendation and moderation systems. Unbundling the social graph will lower switching costs and allow for a marketplace where developers compete on a level playing field, with diverse winners based on user needs and preferences.

In this paper, we propose a solution to the balkanization of social graphs by employing a public protocol for writing and reading social graph data on public consensus systems using data transactions. We include both a structure for the graph as well as the mechanism for

creating authentic claims from and about the user. Further, we outline an approach to sharing content over such a social graph, and ways in which new services can be built to efficiently aggregate and disseminate such information on public consensus systems at the scale required for a universal decentralized graph to be adopted by the majority of the population.

## 2 Solution Overview

The decentralized social networking protocol (DSNP) is composed of three major elements. The first is identity, which creates a representation of users. The second is a social graph, which models relationships between user identities. The final element is messaging, which facilitates communication between the users based on their social graph connections.

We considered many different design aspects when creating the elements of this protocol. Six core aspects we address are:

**Agency:** Who owns and controls the data?

**Privacy:** How and when is data private, and how is that privacy managed?

**Authenticity:** How can protocol actions be verified and attributed?

**Portability:** How can users make use of their personal data in different contexts? What data is available to third parties and how is it obtained?

**Usability:** What options exist for user interaction?

**Extensibility:** How is functionality changed or upgraded over time?

Most social networking products solve only some of these aspects, whether through technical limitations or explicit choices. Vertically integrated products inherently struggle with portability, and many choose not to enforce privacy or ownership standards. Federated protocols, with their dependence on shared servers, generally can't provide strong user data ownership guarantees. Existing decentralized networks have limited privacy and private communication capabilities and struggle with usability, often coupling the ability to exercise core social functionality with transaction fees denominated in a specific cryptocurrency token. We believe the optimal approach to address these six core aspects is a protocol that leverages an existing public consensus system as a neutral, decentralized platform for data and communications, while defining a standard format for data interaction and employing strong encryption for privacy, allowing any number of different user experiences to be created.

DSNP models the identity of a user as individually owned shared state on a public consensus system. Protocol operations allow the user to maintain complete control of their data, and ensure that no third party can revoke their access. These data transactions also act as the root for other protocol actions, allowing user relationships, messages, and content to have a common attribution. The operations enable users to delegate permissions for certain actions in the protocol to third parties, such as user agents or applications,

without sacrificing ownership and control. Delegation allows for cost shifting, so authorized delegates can pay for the calls they invoke on the user’s behalf. A “design by contract” approach allows for functional upgrades and multiple different implementations, while preserving user discretion on when or if to make changes.

The social graph is composed of events emitted on a consensus system, modeling a directed graph of “follow” relationships. Users have direct control to make changes on the graph independent of the provider they are using. Relationships can be public or private, including the indication of whether the event is starting or ending a relationship. By using a common data format on a consensus system, the data has inherent portability. Users decide whom they share their data with, instead of being locked in to a third-party system. As with identity, users can delegate permissions to a user agent or third party, allowing them to emit relationship events on their behalf. In addition, users can share encryption keys to give third parties the ability to read private graph data. The protocol also supports extending relationship types to support other use cases, such as friends, fans, or group membership.

Messaging is modeled as broadcast event announcements on a consensus system that link to content stored on a public file server. The solution supports options for both message and recipient privacy. All message data, whether stored on or off the chain, has a cryptographic chain of trust back to the originating identity. Since all messages are announced on chain, the common data format allows messages to be retrieved by any conforming client or third party, although private messages require the appropriate keys to decrypt them. Users can also delegate permissions to send messages on their behalf, whether for usability or cost-shifting reasons. Finally, the types and formats of messages and message announcements can be expanded over time to support additional use cases, such as reactions, spam scoring, curated topics, or tag-based discovery.

Combined, these elements represent an unbundling of social networks as they currently exist, and create a unified, universally accessible, and decentralized ecosystem for social activity at global scale.

### **3 Identity**

In any social network, users must be consistently identified to engage in most use cases. The protocol defines a concept of identity to represent users in social graph relationships called a Social Identity. Social Identities are pseudonymous,[2] user owned, and default private. These properties are essential to the user’s overall control of their identity. Protocol operations define the interface for interaction with the user’s data, standardizing both how users can share their data with others and how they can delegate certain rights to others to act on their behalf.




Figure 1: Social Identity Ownership Structure

### 3.1 Pseudonymity

DSNP requires Social Identities to be pseudonymous. These identities provide a consistent record of an online actor not directly tied to an offline identity. To implement pseudonymity, the data that represents a Social Identity is owned by an anonymous control key, which allows a user to provide cryptographic proof of ownership. A person may share one Social Identity across multiple contexts, such as family, business, and gaming, or create multiple identities to keep different facets of life separate. Each Social Identity is tied to a separate uncorrelated control key and stored in a user’s digital wallet.

### 3.2 User Agency and Delegation

With most existing social networks, a user’s access to their account can be suspended or revoked unilaterally by the site owner, based on any number of actual or perceived behaviors, resulting in the user’s loss of access to their personal data and social graph. Even though the user populated their account with data and social connections, the site usually owns the account that the user created. A key goal of the protocol is for users to control and have agency over their data. Three techniques are used to ensure that people control their Social Identity: direct data control, rights delegation, and identity verification.

#### 3.2.1 Direct Data Control

Many blockchain-based projects that employ smart contracts use a single contract instance to store multiple user’s rights. While this approach works for simple use cases, such as nonupgradable smart contracts associating ERC-20[3] token values with unique addresses, storing multiple users’ data in a single smart contract means someone other than each user has the right to upgrade the common contract. Whoever has upgrade rights ultimately controls the contract, and therefore the functionality of the contract and the data it stores.<sup>2</sup> Instead, the protocol guarantees that each user’s control key retains sole control of

<sup>2</sup>The first edition of this paper argued for giving users choice in how and when to upgrade their Social Identity as represented specifically by a blockchain smart contract. Further research and development led

their personal data and social graph.

One major ramification of direct control is that the user should always have agency in the adoption of new system logic (for example, smart contract upgrades or blockchain core logic upgrades). At minimum, users require the ability to opt out of their association with a given consensus system. Ideally, consensus systems will enable democratic participation in the governance and adoption of logic related to this protocol; the precise mechanisms that help achieve this (DAOs, co-ops, etc.) are an area of active research within the technology community. This avoids the case of an outside party having unilateral rights to change the behavior of the system without the user’s consent. An outside party in possession of unilateral access rights would be equivalent to the status quo, meaning that existing social network providers have the power to revoke user account access. For a Social Identity, no third party has this capability, within the constraints of the consensus system it is built on.

The “design by contract” approach provides another extension to control: complete implementation change. Although we expect most users to use the same implementation, other implementations may arise to cover unique use cases since the protocol is designed to be interface first.

### **3.2.2 Rights Delegation**

A Social Identity allows users to delegate certain rights to third parties to act on their behalf. This ability is accomplished by creating a system to delegate trust using the user’s control key as owner and sole authority to grant new permissions. All granted permissions can be revoked in the same fashion. Both actions are simply protocol operations.

The delegation of rights never removes the user’s agency over their Social Identity. When delegating rights, it is also possible to limit third-party access to specific actions. Though third-party “bad actors” who receive rights may be able to take actions on the user’s behalf until access is revoked, they cannot escalate their actions to ownership rights.

Rights delegation also allows for cost shifting. Most blockchains, for example, have transaction processing costs associated with smart contract invocations. By allowing a third party to invoke actions on behalf of a user, the user—without sacrificing ownership—can benefit from the third party’s payment of the transaction fee associated with the invocation. A simple example would be an ad-supported social networking client that pays the transaction fee for a user when posting a new image or video.

This concept can also be extended to Social Identity creation by having the user sign a request with the private key from their digital wallet, authorizing a Social Identity to be created on their behalf. This signed request would be passed to a third party, who would

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to the conclusion that creating a coherent public space would only be possible if the participants agreed to follow the same version (with allowances for forward and backward compatibility) of the protocol. The text has been updated to reinforce the important role that user opt-in still plays, but that it may be implemented using a variety of approaches.




Figure 2: Cost Shifting Example

then pay the fee to create a Social Identity, but with the user’s control key as the owner. Such cost shifting is a key element to initial adoption, since it does not require users to own any cryptocurrency to create or use a Social Identity.

### 3.2.3 Identity Verification

Through rights delegation, some invocations of operations on the user’s Social Identity may be made by third parties. To ensure that only authorized delegates make such calls, all operations that allow third-party delegate invocations require the third party to be in the user’s authorized list of delegates and to have the sufficient permissions to invoke the intended action.

Each action on the consensus system taken by an authorized third party can be traced back to the delegate, verifying the identity of the invoker. Delegates who engage in unauthorized activity can be identified and their permissions revoked. Actions previously taken by the abusing party can be refuted by the user.

## 3.3 Attributes

People using social media often choose to expose parts of their identity, or at least the identity that they inhabit on social media. Users can attach claims and metadata to their Social Identity. A set of attributes attached to an identity is often created as a profile: the most common metadata used on social media are display name and avatar, but can extend to claims about the user’s real-world identity, such as name, age, or professional certifications. By using this mechanism, services may be created that verify a user’s real identity, similar to Twitter’s verified accounts, except open for all to use rather than only those who Twitter has “determined to be an account of public interest.” [4]

## 3.4 Portability

When users control their data and it is stored on the consensus system, portability manifests differently than the traditional export/import paradigm. Data is shared with

services instead of stored in services. People can use more than one service at a time while continuing to synchronize data between services. While public data is readable by anyone, private data is controlled through providing a plaintext copy of the data or providing decryption keys to the service.

As a paradigm for portability, sharing requires the ability of a user to revoke access to a service that the user no longer desires to use. Two types of data fall outside the protocol’s protections: plaintext copies and public data. When a user shares data with a service, technical controls in the protocol can no longer protect the user’s data. Instead, control of that copy of the data is governed by the terms of service and the applicable laws governing the service. Depending on jurisdiction or other factors, the European Union General Data Protection Regulation,[5] California Consumer Privacy Act,[6] Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados,[7] and similar regulations may provide coverage, but they are outside the scope of the protocol. By definition, public data is accessible to all and is also governed by local law.

Unlike previously shared data, user control of the creation and sharing of new data is absolute. The user can stop any undesired plaintext sharing and public data publishing. If the user has shared a decryption key with a service, the user must change their encryption key to disable a service’s access to new private data.

## 4 Social Graph

DSNP provides for the decentralized creation and management of a global mapping of all users and how they are related. This global mapping is commonly known as a social graph. Relationships are first-order primitives in the protocol, and they represent connections between users in a social graph. The two most common relationship types in social networks are “Friend” and “Follow.” These relationships represent connections between Social Identities, and can be public or private. Public relationships can be seen by anyone, while private relationships allow user control over who can view them.

### 4.1 Relationship Types

Users, represented by Social Identities, are the vertices in the social graph, and relationships are the edges. These relationships can be directed, such as in a Follow relationship, or undirected, such as in a Friend relationship. Twitter is an example of the directed Follow model. A public Follow relationship is created by the follower, but it does not require the permission of the followed.<sup>3</sup> The reciprocal relationship can also exist, but it is not required. The follower controls both the formation and removal of the relationship. Facebook and LinkedIn are examples of networks that have an undirected Friend model. This requires the permission of both users to form the relationship, but either can remove it. DSNP uses Follow-based, directed edges in its social graph. The undirected Friend relationship, along with other relationship types, can use this directed approach as a

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<sup>3</sup>Twitter allows for various tweaks to this simplistic model; blocking and privacy options, for example.

building block for more complex relationship types. Access to encrypted, private posts requires permission from the user being followed in order to obtain the appropriate decryption keys, and closely resembles the process of creating a Friend relationship.

## 4.2 Graph Change Events

The protocol models the creation or removal of a Follow relationship as a Graph Change Event.<sup>4</sup> The sequence of these events represents the current state of the social graph rooted at each Social Identity. The event structure allows some data to be either public or private, even though all events on a public consensus system are by necessity public. A mechanism is also provided for sharing private event data with trusted parties.

### 4.2.1 Structure

To create a Follow relationship, the aspiring follower creates a Graph Change Event, with themselves as the Actor, the Social Identity they want to follow as the Object, and follow as the Action. The Graph Change Event is then published via a protocol operation on the user's Social Identity, making it visible on the consensus system.

Graph Change Events have four major components<sup>5</sup>:

**Type:** Whether this is a public or private Graph Change Event.

**Actor:** The Social Identity creating the event. In a public Follow relationship, this would be the follower.

**Object:** The Social Identity that is being linked to the event. In a public Follow relationship, this would be the user being followed or unfollowed.

**Action:** The action being taken. In a public Follow relationship, the options are follow and unfollow.

A series of Graph Change Events are depicted in Figure 3, along with the resulting state on the consensus system (notice that the unfollowed friends are no longer present).

### 4.2.2 Privacy

Graph Change Events always have unencrypted Type and Actor values. Graph Change Events of type public also have unencrypted "Object" and "Action" values. Graph Change Events of type private encrypt the values for "Object" and Action. This means that, despite the Graph Change Event being published to the consensus system, a key is

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<sup>4</sup>Since this paper was originally published, the specification has endorsed handling of graph changes by updating shared state in aggregated form via the User Data operations. However, from a systems reasoning point of view, viewing changes to the social graph as discrete events is still relevant.

<sup>5</sup>Actor and Object terms are borrowed from the Activity Streams 2.0 Vocabulary[8]




Figure 3: Graph Change Events

required to interpret the encrypted values. A user generates a symmetric encryption key for encrypting the private Graph Change Events data.<sup>6</sup> The user can store this encryption key in their wallet or on chain (see the “Key Storage” section). While private Graph Change Events do not allow outside observers to read who is being followed, it is still possible to see that the Social Identity expressed in the Actor field is actively publishing a particular type of event, which may still convey some level of valuable metadata information to a third party.

### 4.2.3 Validation

Graph Change Events are only partially validated when published to the consensus system. Type and Actor are validated as part of the publishing process. However, since Object and Action may be encrypted and unreadable by the consensus system logic, they are validated by the consumer of the Graph Change Event message. Private Graph Change Events can be validated only by those who can decrypt the data.<sup>7,8</sup>

### 4.2.4 Sharing

While public Graph Change Events are fully understandable by everyone, without additional action, only the Actor user has the ability to interpret their private Graph Change Events. Users may wish to share their graph with other users, user agents, or third-party online tools. Sharing is a conceptually simple process, but like many self-sovereign schemes, ceasing sharing is substantially more complicated.

To share their list of private Graph Change Events with another party, the user can simply communicate their symmetric key through a secure direct channel. Doing so allows the other party to read the data, but does not allow them to modify it. The key is used for data encryption, but does not allow signing new Graph Change Events from that Actor.<sup>9</sup> This simple approach, however, is complicated by the need to be able to cease sharing with a third party.

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<sup>6</sup>The specification now utilizes asymmetric key pairs to generate one-off symmetric keys via a key agreement algorithm. This provides improved security and allows for additional use cases while minimizing key management overhead.

<sup>7</sup>There may be ways for Social Identity addresses to be deterministic. This would provide ways for a user to follow users who have not yet joined, but might later join, the network.

<sup>8</sup>It might be possible to create Graph Change Events where the Object is not a Social Identity. Shifting validation to the event consumer would make context available for validation that would be unavailable within the constraints of consensus system transaction processing.

<sup>9</sup>The third party would also have to be a delegate with the appropriate permissions on the user’s Social Identity, in addition to having the symmetric key, in order to post a valid Graph Change Event.




Figure 4: Key Storage and Retrieval

#### 4.2.5 Cease Sharing

To stop sharing private Graph Change Events with a third party, the symmetric key used to encrypt data on the Graph Change Event is rotated to a new value. No existing Graph Change Events are changed, but new Graph Change Events will use the new key to encrypt their private data. While the third party can continue to read the data from before the key rotation,<sup>10</sup> they cannot observe new changes to the graph, including unfollow Actions of Graph Change Event events for Objects they previously saw. The ability to revoke access to new Graph Change Events, much like the ability to revoke access to actions on their Social Identity, ensures that users maintain control of their graph data and its accessibility across various networks and tools.

#### 4.2.6 Key Storage

To maintain portability, the keys used to encrypt private Graph Change Events need to be stored such that they are accessible from multiple devices. These keys can be serialized and

<sup>10</sup>It is impossible to prove that something has been forgotten, thus access to old data can be enforced only by the delegate, not the user.

encrypted and stored on the consensus system. The wallet has a few options for encrypting data, such as using the private key to deterministically generate a key useful for encryption<sup>11</sup> and EIP-2844.[10] Each key is then able to be retrieved and decrypted by the wallet as needed.

## 5 Messaging

DSNP addresses messaging as a first-order concept so users can communicate with each other through a social graph. Posts, replies, reactions/likes, and direct messages are all examples of different message types today in social networks. To enable messaging, several key components are needed:

**Announcement:** A structure representing that a message exists

**Announcement Metadata:** Key metadata embedded in an announcement allowing message verification and simple correlation of related messages

**Content:** Detailed data containing the message text, additional metadata, and media links

Combined, these components allow for a minimal model of most current social network messaging use cases, including broadcast and directed messaging types, as well as public and private messaging types. They may also be adapted to Layer 2 strategies to manage scale and cost. An example of this is Batch Message Announcements, as described in Appendix 6.

### 5.1 Announcements

Announcements allow users to become aware of messages in different ways, depending on the type of message. Email uses SMTP to communicate between persistent nodes. Existing balkanized social networks perform this task by directly updating their internal systems. In a decentralized network without unique persistent nodes, however, the difficulty in making Announcements is twofold. First, the route to the receiver is not fixed; a user may be in multiple locations or using multiple devices. Second, the receiver may have only intermittent connectivity, so the network needs to maintain Announcements until the receiver is available. In addition, in the social media case, users expect that messages sent today will persist for followers added in the future, indefinitely.

These constraints lead to a system of Announcements that are anchored to the consensus system. This system allows message recipients to replay messages as necessary or to monitor the system for incremental Announcements as they are created. To accomplish this task, Announcements include a minimal set of essential metadata that can be used to quickly filter messages needed for a given user.

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<sup>11</sup>Used in MetaMask.[9]




Figure 5: Announcement Metadata Structure

## 5.2 Announcement Metadata

The protocol models a flexible Announcement data structure. All Announcements have at least four key attributes, but the format allows extensions to this data set to accomplish additional use cases. The four key attributes are:

- Message Type
- Social Identity that is the source of the message
- URI of the content
- Hash of the content located by the content URI

These key attributes allow Announcements to answer four key questions:

1. What type of message is this?
2. Who sent this message?
3. Where is the content located?
4. Is the content I am seeing exactly what was originally sent?

The four key attributes defined as metadata on each Announcement answer this set of questions for all Announcement types, and help prove the validity and authenticity of the related data.

### 5.2.1 What type of message is this?

Messages are modeled as events on the consensus system. Each Message Type is represented by a different event. The simplest is a Broadcast message, which has only the four key attributes already identified for an Announcement. Message Types may define additional attributes needed for their specific use case.

### 5.2.2 Who sent this message?

As described in the section on Social Identity, the user has the ability to authorize third parties to take actions on their behalf via the protocol. This means that a valid message must come from the user's Social Identity, but that the operation may be invoked by the user or an authorized third party. This allows more flexible use cases, such as delayed sending and cost shifting. When verifying a message sent in this manner, the consensus system security mechanism combined with the implementation logic can be used to ensure that only an authorized party sent the author's message. While authenticating authorship is expected to be primarily the domain of aggregators or other intermediaries, it is important that any message recipient be able to directly and independently authenticate message authorship in order to ensure portability and system integrity.

### 5.2.3 Where is the content located?

Content hosting is assumed, by default, to be the responsibility of the sender. It is, however, possible for the sender to delegate this responsibility to a third party. The only criteria for content hosting is that the data should be persistently available and have unrestricted access for retrieval. The Announcement contains a URI of the content location, enabling recipients to retrieve the content. The URI is expected to most often be an HTTPS<sup>12</sup> URL, allowing direct access to the referenced content, but any other protocol that is generally accessible may be substituted. Examples include Swarm or IPFS, with the caveat that protocols not supported by a recipient's user agent may limit interoperability.

### 5.2.4 Is the content I am seeing exactly what was originally sent?

The Announcement contains a Hash of the content referenced by the content URI. When the content is retrieved, the retrieved content can be hashed using the same algorithm and compared with the Hash in the Announcement. Matching Hashes indicate that the content is valid. To ensure unique hashes between Social Identities, the contents of the message must include an author property that matches the announcing identity. Content retrieved from a proxy or cache can also be validated, even when from a different URI, as long as the content is not transformed by such mechanisms.

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<sup>12</sup>Why not HTTP? Serving HTTP content to HTTPS websites will fail in most browsers, but serving HTTPS content to an HTTP website will still work.

## 5.3 Content

After a user has received a message Announcement and retrieved and authenticated the contents of a message, the content must still be interpreted. DSNP is adapting the W3C Recommendation on Activity Streams[8] to represent content data and metadata. Only minimal changes to the standard are needed to achieve integration with the consensus system-related use cases, and the expected changes may be compatible with existing tools. In addition, this may make it possible to bridge the unified graph emanating from the protocol and other Activity Stream implementations, as a result of common data models for content.

Required changes to Activity Streams include enhancements to implement additional data for certain elements. An example is the Link model in Activity Streams for linking to images. While content can be authenticated through a chain of hashes or signatures back from Announcement to the trust of the consensus system, complete validation would require that the chain of hashes or signatures continue to the images or other data linked in the content. “Link” is augmented with a hash that can be used to easily verify that the linked content has not changed.

## 5.4 Broadcast and Directed Messaging

As previously described, the Message Type specifies the behavior and ancillary attributes of a message. Four key Message Types are defined here, though additional types may be created:

**Broadcast:** A message with no recipient

**Reply:** A message with a referent or source message

**Direct:** A message with a public recipient

**Dead Drop:** A message with a private recipient

### 5.4.1 Broadcast

A Broadcast message is an Announcement with no recipient. Users primarily discover these messages by following the author and monitoring for messages with the author as the sender. Such messages may also be aggregated into public feeds and presented by recommendation algorithms. This form of message is analogous to public social media posts.

### 5.4.2 Reply

A Reply message is just like a Broadcast Announcement, but with a referent (“In Reply To”) message ID. A Reply message Announcement depends on the fact that content Hashes are unique for any content and Social Identity combination. As mentioned before,

the content needs to include a matching author to validate. Each message may then generate its Hash before the Announcement is made and can therefore be referred to in an unambiguous fashion. A Reply Announcement uses this value as the referent message ID. A Reply message can reference a Broadcast Announcement or another Reply Announcement. This form of message is analogous to a comment on a public post on a Facebook page. Replies do not need to have complex content and can be used to represent reactions such as likes or upvotes.

The need for this additional piece of information at the Announcement level instead of in content metadata is driven by discoverability. Users are often interested in replies to messages they have already discovered or are otherwise made aware of from Social Identities they do not follow. By placing the reference message in the Announcement, users can discover entire subtrees of content related to messages they have already received. Without such a mechanism, they would need to monitor all messages on the chain, retrieve the content URL, and examine it for relevance. At any scale, such actions are prohibitively inefficient.

### 5.4.3 Direct

A Direct message is sent to a specific Social Identity. Both the sender and the receiver are public, although the contents of the message would usually be encrypted. This message is analogous to an invitation to connect on LinkedIn. One of the ways users discover relevant message Announcements is by looking for Direct messages sent to their Social Identity. Friend requests or other cases where a recipient might not otherwise know to look for message Announcements from the message sender can use Direct messages to establish communications.

### 5.4.4 Dead Drop

A Dead Drop message is an Announcement that uses a special mechanism, called a Dead Drop Identifier (DDID), to indicate the recipient of the message, instead of a Social Identity. The intention is to provide end-to-end encryption and metadata privacy by concealing the intended recipient, in order to avoid revealing the receiver's private social graph relationships through metadata analysis. This is analogous to a Twitter direct message, where outside parties can neither read the message nor even determine that the two parties are communicating with each other. DSNP extends this protection, preventing service providers from reading message contents or knowing who is communicating.

Dead Drop Announcements must be addressed with care. The intended recipient needs to know that the Announcement is for them, but the network must not. One option for a user to discover a message intended for them with an encrypted recipient field is to attempt to decrypt every encrypted message on the network. The Whisper protocol from the Ethereum Foundation uses this model.<sup>13</sup> As referenced for Reply Announcements, this

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<sup>13</sup>“Topics” provide a small amount of difficulty reduction, but only at a privacy loss.[11]




Figure 6: Message Types and Replies




Figure 7: DDID Flow For Alice with Two Associates

option is prohibitively inefficient at scale.

The protocol uses a novel Dead Drop ID system similar to the dead drops that are a staple of classic spycraft. For example, Alice places a message under a bench in the park. Anyone who stumbles upon the message would be unable to identify the intended recipient. Bob, however, knows the dead-drop location and can privately discover, retrieve, and read the message.

Classic dead drops have a major logistical issue: The dead-drop location must be known to both the sending and receiving parties, but not to anyone else. This means the two parties must have an initial means of communicating before they establish the dead drop. No matter how secure the dead-drop mechanism is on its own, it relies on the security of the initial means of communication. Unlike the physical realm, public key cryptography provides a means to independently derive a common shared secret without prior private communication.[12] Dead Drop Announcements leverage this shared secret to algorithmically create unique Dead Drop Identifiers that cannot be traced to the intended recipient.

The identifiers are unique based on each sender-receiver, so each user has a different Dead Drop Identifier for sending a message to the other. This is analogous to Alice passing messages to Bob by leaving them under a park bench, and Bob passing messages to Alice by leaving them in a planter outside the hardware store: Two private, simplex channels with recipient privacy create a single, duplex channel with recipient privacy. At the event level, an observer can see that Alice and Bob are both sending messages, but cannot determine that they are sending messages to each other. If Alice and Bob each run their own consensus system node for retrieving content, or use nodes not run by a bad actor, they should also not be susceptible to information retrieval attacks, though timing attacks exploiting correlation between their activities are not prevented.

While Dead Drop Identifiers can be derived without a separate secure communication channel, there must be some trigger for two users to start listening to each others' DDIDs. This intent may be communicated out of band, but may also be triggered implicitly or explicitly by on-chain actions. For example, user agents can choose to monitor DDIDs for all public followers of a Social Identity, whether perpetually or for a specific period of time

after a follow notification. Alternatively, a Direct message Announcement could be sent from one user to the other with encrypted content expressing the desire to communicate with DDIDs, causing both to derive and monitor the relevant DDID values.

#### 5.4.5 Other Message Types

The Announcement Message Types are extensible and are a flexible mechanism for adding new features to the core messaging capabilities of the protocol. For example, spam scoring services can express a spam score about Broadcast messages by extending Reply messages with a new Message Type and including scoring data in the Announcement or content. The same mechanism can be used for other services, such as fact checking, reputation scoring, or moderation, to add arbitrary metadata to an existing message.

A Message Type may also be constructed to refer to a group of Announcements. This type enables “batching” or Layer 2 Announcements to reach the consensus system in a cost-efficient structure, while still preserving the authenticity of messages. A simple Batch Message Announcement structure is described in Appendix 6.

Another Message Type common to social media is a Reaction type. Reactions are similar to Reply Announcements, but with different metadata attached. A Reaction might have a sentiment value of positive, neutral, or negative, as well as a suggested rendering. The sentiment allows for simple cross-client display of reactions, while a suggested rendering can be used to expand the range of emotion for supporting clients.

## 6 Batch Message Announcements

A Batch Announcement is an extension of the Broadcast Announcement, and has the same set of data. It exists to allow the “batching” of all Announcement Message Types. Batch Announcements allow the publication of more than one message Announcement with a single on-chain Announcement. These Batch Messages introduce a new service role called a Batch Announcer, which collects message Announcements and batches them together. They have some trade-offs versus other Message Types, but allow substantial scaling increases and cost reductions.

A Batch Announcement has a different Message Type than a Broadcast Announcement, but otherwise has the same structure. However, the URI for a Batch Announcement always refers to a Batch Message file, the content of which has a specific file format, and is an ordered list of other Announcements. Each of the included Announcements has its complete set of Announcement metadata, including Message Type, Social Identity source, content URI, content Hash, and any type-specific Metadata (for example, a Reply Announcement would also have a referent message ID). Each Announcement also contains the Social Identity address of the sender and a signature of the URI content, replacing the signature that would have been used when posting to the consensus system. The Announcements included in the Batch Message file are not broadcast directly to the




Figure 8: Batch Message Structure

consensus system. However, since each message in the Batch Message file has a Hash, Social Identity, and signature, and the Batch Announcement has a Hash of the Batch Message file, authenticity still traces from each individual user message back to the chain, using techniques such as EIP -1271,[13] BLS12-377,[14] or other similar approaches.

This approach has a number of trade-offs. Benefits include lower cost and better scaling while maintaining authenticity. Drawbacks include increased complexity and the off-chain nature of messages referenced by Batch Messages. Increased complexity comes from the additional indirection used by Batch Messages. However, as volume increases, most clients will use dedicated content indexing services, which should have no issue with indexing Batch Messages. Potential latency comes from Batch Announcers only periodically posting Batch Announcements. The off-ledger nature of referenced messages can be mitigated by Indexers and other consensus system watchers replicating or caching Batch Message files. While a file can be removed, the existence of the Batch Message is listed on the chain, providing evidence that a file previously existed and allowing any file copy to be verified for authenticity against the listed Hash.

Batch Messages are another example of the flexibility and extensibility of the protocol, enabling implementation on cost-sensitive consensus systems including sidechain or other Layer 2 blockchain solutions. Users have the option to publish Announcements directly or through an Announcement service. Batch Announcements work in cooperation with, not as a replacement for, other Message Types, while providing orders-of-magnitude scaling increases and cost reductions.




Figure 9: Example Batch Process

## 7 Conclusion

This paper has proposed a protocol for creating a unified, universally accessible, decentralized social graph and an associated ecosystem of software services and applications. A modern social media company is highly complex, with many different components requiring a wide variety of deep expertise. From technical components such as software clients, caching services, and recommendation engines,[15] to more business-oriented concerns such as moderation, advertising sales, and regulatory compliance, each piece is a critical component of the network. This protocol enables coordination between services to build the complex ecosystem required to sustain modern social media without the liabilities of centralization. The next step is to create a comprehensive protocol specification leveraging the significant technical work already completed.

Creating a complete system with so many components can be difficult when all functionality must occur inside a single organization. By unbundling the social network, an entire ecosystem can be created to operate at global scale and allow a diverse array of experts to address the pressing challenges created by malicious actors in the network. With a public broadcast model of protocol events, new services can be created to provide simple interfaces and data layers to create and consume data. These SaaS (Software as a Service) tools can provide an infrastructure layer that clients can leverage in unique combinations




Figure 10: SaaS Ecosystem

for different use cases. Figure 8 illustrates a hypothetical ecosystem of independent components that leverage the protocol to create a complete social networking system.

A diversity of approaches, leveraging the interoperability of common data formats and discovery, minimize the effort to create new experiences. Graph indexing services can take on the load of parsing and storing graph events from the consensus system to provide easy access to graph data, including mechanisms to handle encrypted events. Content indexing services can enable content feed building, message threading, search results, trending topics, or caching, and, since all Announcements provide the information needed to authenticate the content, can combine trust and convenience. Content moderation and fact checking can be provided by multiple separate services for different use cases or interest groups, enabling more reliable, comprehensive, and transparent moderation. Given the open nature of the network, developers can offer different revenue models that can exist side by side, such as advertising, subscription, or direct payment, while allowing all experiences to interoperate directly.

The protocol allows for the same underlying information to be available to everyone independent of intermediaries. Separating responsibilities encourages competition while better aligning incentives with user interest. The range of possibilities is difficult to predict, but by ensuring user data control and decentralizing the interaction model, the protocol allows for an entire ecosystem of participants to innovate and flourish.

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